Main Lesson
The First World War was an unprecedented catastrophe that shaped our modern world . Erik Sass is track the events of the war exactly 100 years after they happened . This is the 129th installing in the series .
26 January 2025: “A Leap In the Dark”
On July 14 , 1914 — the twenty-four hour period Austria - Hungary ’s leaders last decide on war with Serbia — Germany ’s Chancellor Bethmann - Hollweg told his friend and advisor , the philosopher Kurt Riezler , that Germany was about to take “ a leaping in the night ” by backing the design . But to be honest , Germany and Austria - Hungary were already control in the dark , step on each other ’s toes as they stumbled towards war .
By mid - July , Berlin and Vienna hadagreedon exactly one thing : Austria - Hungary was conk out to use the slaying of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as a pretext to crush Serbia , which would ( hopefully ) terminate the threat of Pan - Slav patriotism once and for all . But all the vital details , including the timing of the attack , remain unresolved .
To be fair , nothing was ever simple in Austria - Hungary , especially if it involved gravid decisions , which were avoid whenever possible . When an important determination simply had to be made , it required audience and consent from both the Austrian and Magyar half of the Empire . In this type , Imperial Foreign Minister Count Berchtold and honcho of the world-wide staff Conrad von Hötzendorf ( both Austrians ) had to convert Hungarian Premier Count István Tisza to support their warfare architectural plan . But Tisza was not the form of man to be maneuvered into a conclusion he disagreed with , even if it had the bread and butter of Emperor Franz Josef himself .
Wikimedia Commons ( 1,2,3 )
From July 10 to 14 , 1914 , everything finally came together to sway Tisza to thewar party . First his need for grounds was quenched by the investigation of Baron Friedrich von Wiesner , who arrived in Sarajevo on July 11 and on July 13 institutionalise a preliminary report that cleared Serbia ’s government of involvement but hound the plot back to Serbianarmy officers , stating there was “ scarcely a dubiousness that the crime was resolved upon in Belgrade , and ready with the cooperation of Serbian official … "
Around this time , the Austrians also received a hope of neutrality from Romania in the event of war , slay another source of hesitation for Tisza , who fearedunrestin Hungary ’s Rumanian population . But the trumpet card was the position of Berlin . Tisza knew that Austria - Hungary depended on Germany for security measure , and Berchtold ram down home the message that Berlin expected Vienna to settle the Serbian problem now — and if it did n’t , the exacerbate Germans might decide the coalition was n’t deserving the problem .
The extraneous minister could point to a string of subject matter from Berlin urging action ( in a typically Byzantine ruse , Berchtold may have secretly asked the Germans to send these message to help him win over Tisza ) . On July 12 , the Austro - Magyar ambassador to Berlin , Count Szőgyény , advised Vienna that “ Kaiser Wilhelm and all other responsible personage here … invite us not to let the present moment make it but to take vigorous measures against Serbia and make a fresh sweep of the revolutionary plotter ’ nest there once and for all . ” As for the peril of a panoptic warfare , the Germans believed “ It is by no means certain that if Serbia becomes involved in a war with us , Russia would resort to arm in her support … The German Government further believe it has sure indications that England at the present moment would not unite in a war over a Balkan nation … ”
As a cautious nobleman , Tisza ’s maingoalwas exert the traditional ordination , which above all meant preserve the Hapsburg monarchy , the source of all political legitimacy . On top of this and evidence of Serbian complicity , German pressure finally tipped the balance , and at a second encounter of the pate council on July 14 , 1914 , Tisza agreed to the plan for an ultimatum followed by war . This should have been cause for wallow in Vienna and Berlin — but now the allies found themselves at betting odds over timing , as the Germans pressed for immediate action and the Austrians pleaded for holdup .
Critical Delays
The first problem was the discovery by honcho of the ecumenical stave Conrad that a large part of Austria - Hungary ’s armed forces was away on summertime leave until late July . secondly , Berchtold and his fellow curate knew that French President Raymond Poincaré and Premier René Viviani were due to chat France ’s friend Russia from July 20 - 23 ; if the ultimatum became public while they were still guest of Tsar Nicholas II in St. Petersburg , the Gallic and Russian loss leader would be able to confer in person and ferment out a coordinated reaction to the Austrian gambit — exactly what Berchtold did n’t need . On the other hand , if Austria - Hungary wait until after the sojourn to institutionalize the ultimatum , the Gallic leaders would be at sea and relatively isolated , as prospicient - space ship - to - shoring radio communications were still dodgy at best . The sudden expiry of the Russian embassador to Serbia , Baron NicholasHartwig , on July 10 could only add to the mental confusion ( hugely obese , Hartwig died of a heart fire while visit the Austro - Hungarian embassy , fueling scuttlebutt of a covert character assassination ) .
Beginning with the crown council on July 14 , the Austrians formulated a plan employing deception on a grand shell . They would fork up the ultimatum to Serbia on the eve of July 23 , after Poincaré and Viviani were safely at ocean , and give Belgrade 48 time of day to respond , so they could proceed immediately to mobilization on July 25 . Until then , however , Vienna and Berlin would avoid any tinge of belligerence in ordering to tranquillize Russia , France and Britain into a false sense of security .
The Germans were n’t happy about Vienna ’s decision to look until belated July , reasoning it was better to chance on now in the hopes of catching the Triple Entente savorless - footed . On July 11 Riezler recorded Bethmann - Hollweg ’s attitude : “ [ The Austrians ] apparently require a terribly long metre to mobilize … That is very unsafe . A quick fait accompli , and then favorable toward the Entente , then we could hold up the shock . ” In the same vein , on July 13 the German chief of the cosmopolitan stave , Helmuth vonMoltke(on holiday in Karlsbad , Bohemia ) inspire , “ Austria must drum the Serbs and then make public security quickly . ”
The Italian Question
Berlin and Vienna also disagreed on the vital question of whether to inform Italy , theunreliablethird member of the Triple Alliance , about their programme . The only way Italy might be persuaded to fall in them in a war of hostility was the hope of territorial concessions — specifically Austria ’s own cultural Italian lands in the Trentino and Trieste ( top and below , in red ) , long covet by Italian nationalist as the last lacking firearm of a united Italy . But the Germans and Austrians did n’t see centre - to - middle on this issue : While the Germans were quite well-to-do offering up chunks of their ally , the Austrians were intelligibly reluctant to give up lands that had been part of the Hapsburg patrimony for hundred .
Main Lesson / Albanian Photography
As early as June 30 , the German ambassador to Vienna , Tschirschky , urged Berchtold to confabulate Italy , and on July 2 he repeated the advice to Emperor Franz Josef , but the Austrians brushed off the German concerns . The issue reemerged in the following calendar week , when it became clear Italy might not stand lazily by if Austria - Hungary attacked Serbia . On July 10 , Italy ’s Foreign Minister San Giuliano ( above ) warned the German ambassador , Baron Ludwig von Flotow , that Italy would have to be make up for any enlargement by Austria - Hungary in the Balkans , name Austrian Trentino as the price . Increasingly alarmed by the Italian position , on July 15 Germany ’s Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow again urge on Austria - Hungary to take Italy into her confidence in a content to Tschirschky , the German ambassador in Vienna :
But once again , the German warnings fell on deaf ears in Vienna . Frustrated by Vienna ’s repeated refusals , the Germans take thing into their own work force on July 11 , when Flotow render to get the testicle rolling by secretly outlining Austria - Hungary ’s plans in a meeting with Foreign Minister San Giuliano . Even worse from the Austro - Hungarian ( and later German ) perspective , the leak begin spreading as San Giuliano sent telegram to Italy ’s ambassadors across Europe , warning that Austria - Hungary was planning something big . Because all the Great Powers routinely listen in on diplomatic communications , Russian intelligence agency in all probability decrypted the Italian subject matter and informed Russian diplomat , who in turn spread the word to France and Britain . Thus Poincaré and Viviani likely know something was afoot when they met the czar and his ministers from July 20 to 23 , generate them pot of time to align their response .
See theprevious installmentorall entry .
